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SHOULD NEITHER WIND NOR RAIN NOR 
HURRICANE KEEP VICTIMS FROM RECOVERY?  
EXAMINING THE TORT AND INSURANCE 
SYSTEMS’ ABILITY TO COMPENSATE 
HURRICANE VICTIMS 
Kathleen A. Zink* 
 
Large-scale natural disasters, such as hurricanes, wreak tremendous 
havoc, causing billions of dollars in damages.  Those who suffer serious 
damage may turn to their insurance providers or the tort system for 
compensation.  But, both the tort and insurance systems present serious 
limitations to a hurricane victim’s recovery.  This Note analyzes the goals 
and criticisms of these two systems to determine which compensates 
hurricane victims best.  In light of its analysis, this Note ultimately 
concludes that neither system satisfactorily compensates victims.  Yet, tort 
could play some role in hurricane-related damage.  Tort law could 
effectively deter negligent behavior by imposing liability on those who 
negligently fail to prepare and prevent hurricane-related damage. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On October 29, 2012, “Superstorm” Sandy made landfall on the coast of 
New Jersey.1  Sandy’s powerful storm surge topped the sea wall in New 
York City’s financial district, flooding lower Manhattan.2  Shortly after 
breaching the sea wall, the record storm surge sent water pouring into the 
basements and lobbies of downtown buildings, including 2 Gold Street and 
201 Pearl Street.3  The saltwater crystallized in the basement of 2 Gold, 
causing significant damage to the boiler and electrical switchboards.4  
Further, the water caused the 20,000-gallon oil tank to rupture and release 
oil into the floodwaters.5  The contaminated water released diesel fuel 
fumes throughout the towers.6  The smell of diesel even reached apartments 
on the highest floor of 2 Gold.7  Due to the damages to operational systems, 
including electric, hot water, water filtration, and sprinkler systems, “all of 
which were below grade,” the building’s manager, TF Cornerstone, 
informed the building’s residents that the earliest date for reoccupancy 
would be March 1, 2013.8 
On November 19, 2012, residents filed a putative class action in New 
York State court alleging that TF Cornerstone negligently failed to secure 
the premises, despite warnings issued by the National Hurricane Center and 
the New York City government.9  The suit alleged gross negligence, 
negligence, and breach of the warranty of habitability.10  The plaintiffs 
claimed that TF Cornerstone failed to protect the property, particularly the 
entrance to its parking garage with sandbags, or to take other effective 
precautions.11  The complaint also alleged that many apartments in the 
building were burglarized by nonresidents because of the managing agent’s 
negligence.12  The plaintiffs seek, among other things, an award of 
damages.13 
When the residents of 2 Gold and 201 Pearl suffered personal and 
financial losses due to Hurricane Sandy, they turned to tort law for 
compensation.  Their other alternative, if insured, would have been to file a 
claim with their insurance providers. 
 
 1. See Hurricane Sandy:  Timeline, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, 
http://www.fema.gov/hurricane-sandy-timeline (last visited Nov. 26, 2014). 
 2. See Assessing the Damage from Hurricane Sandy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/10/30/nyregion/hurricane-sandys-
aftermath.html?_r=0. 
 3. See Summons & Class Action Complaint, ¶ 36, at 8, Cashwell v. 2 Gold, LLC (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Nov. 19, 2012) (No. 158155/2012), 2014 WL 3543541. 
 4. See id. ¶ 38, at 9. 
 5. Id. ¶ 39, at 9. 
 6. Id. ¶ 40, at 9. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See id. ¶ 53, at 11. 
 9. See id. ¶ 1, at 1–2. 
 10. See id. ¶ 54–74, at 11–14. 
 11. See id. ¶ 37, at 8. 
 12. See id. ¶ 43, at 9. 
 13. Id. at 15. 
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In tort, a person who is harmed may file a civil lawsuit to recover 
damages from the person who caused the harm.14  The law, however, will 
only impose civil liability if the law recognizes a legal obligation, known as 
a duty, owed to the injured person by the injurer.15  Tort law recognizes that 
the person who should have prevented the injury should be held responsible 
for the resulting injury and losses.16  Thus, when an injured person is best 
able to avoid his injuries, “[n]o one else [is] responsibl[e] for the harm that 
has befallen him.”17  When the tort system imposes civil liability on a 
defendant and provides a victim damages, it acts similarly to the insurance 
system by shifting “the cost of providing financial resources for accident 
victims” from the victim to another party.18 
After a natural disaster like Hurricane Sandy, the insurance industry is 
rarely left unaffected by the losses incurred by policyholders during the 
storm.  “[I]nsurance companies will pay an estimated 18.8 billion dollars in 
claims to their policyholders” for property damage caused by Hurricane 
Sandy, “making Sandy the third costliest storm in U.S. history, as defined 
by insurance claims payouts.”19  Hurricane Katrina in 2005 cost insurance 
companies $48.7 billion and Hurricane Andrew in 1992 cost $25.6 billion.20 
The storm-related personal and financial losses like those suffered by the 
residents of 2 Gold and 201 Pearl Street are not unusual and are expected to 
increase in the United States.21  While there is no definitive scientific 
evidence showing “whether storms like Sandy are growing more common, 
evidence indicates climate change is already altering environmental 
conditions in a way that suggests there may be changes in the frequency, 
intensity, duration, and timing of future” storms.22  The federal and state 
 
 14. See infra Part I.A. 
 15. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 16. See MARSHA L. BAUM, WHEN NATURE STRIKES:  WEATHER DISASTERS AND THE LAW 
63 (2007). 
 17. See id. at 63–64. 
 18. See Beatrice A. Beltran, Posner and Tort Law As Insurance, 7 CONN. INS. L.J. 153, 
154 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 19. See Over 90 Percent of the New Jersey and New York Sandy Insurance Claims Have 
Been Settled; Likely to Be Third Largest Storm Ever for U.S. Insurers, U.S. INS. INFO. INST., 
http://www.iii.org/press_releases/over-90-percent-of-the-new-jersey-and-new-york-sandy-
insurance-claims-have-been-settled-likely-to-be-third-largest-hurricane-ever-for-us-
insurers.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2014).  These insurance payouts are for property 
coverage only.  Any flood damage covered by the National Flood Insurance Program is not 
included. Id. 
 20. See id.  The insured damage amounts for Hurricanes Katrina and Andrew have been 
adjusted for inflation through 2012 by the Insurance Information Institute using the 
Consumer Price Index. Id. 
 21. See HURRICANE SANDY REBUILDING TASK FORCE, HURRICANE SANDY REBUILDING 
STRATEGY:  STRONGER COMMUNITIES, A RESILIENT REGION 33 (2013) [hereinafter SANDY 
REBUILDING STRATEGY]. 
 22. See id.; see also Kerry A. Emanuel, Downscaling CMIP5 Climate Models Shows 
Increased Tropical Cyclone Activity over the 21st Century, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 
AM. 12219 (2013).  This study predicts a 40 percent global increase in hurricanes of 
Category 3 and higher over the twenty-first century. Id. at 12221. 
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governments have recognized these future risks and have responded 
accordingly.23 
This Note considers whether courts should also play a role in hurricane-
related events by offering compensation through the tort system or rather 
should leave compensation to insurers.  Part I provides an overview of the 
development of tort and the negligence doctrine, and outlines the problems 
faced by hurricane victims when they turn to the tort system for 
compensation.  Part II examines the basics of insurance law, the insurance 
issues raised by Hurricane Katrina, and both the state and federal responses 
to hurricane-related insurance gaps.  Part III details the justifications 
advanced in favor of the tort and insurance systems, while also examining 
these systems’ major criticisms.  Finally, Part IV applies these goals and 
criticisms to the circumstances of hurricane victims and suggests that 
neither mechanism adequately compensates hurricane victims, although tort 
may play a deterrence role in the hurricane-related context. 
I.   DEVELOPMENT OF TORT LAW 
This part examines the development of tort law and the negligence 
doctrine, and the role the doctrine plays within the law more broadly.  It 
next describes the elements of a traditional tort claim.  It then explains the 
role foreseeability plays in a court’s negligence analysis and how courts 
sometimes use a balancing approach to determining liability.  Finally, it 
discusses hurricane-related tort issues. 
Torts are broadly defined24 to encompass any “civil wrong, other than 
breach of contract, for which the court will provide a remedy in the form of 
an action for damages.”25  Tort law involves “many cases of first 
impression” in which “new . . . torts are being recognized constantly.”26 
The origins of tort law are found in early English common law.27  In 
English law, “remedies for wrongs depended upon the issuance of writs to 
bring the defendant into court.”28  The number and forms of writs were 
 
 23. See SANDY REBUILDING STRATEGY, supra note 21; see also S. 3761, 2013 Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013).  The New York Senate passed a bill called the Natural 
Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation Act, recognizing that New York’s climate and weather 
patterns are changing, “due, in part, to global warming [and] that large areas of the state have 
been severely impacted by repeated hurricanes, tropical storms and other weather related 
natural disasters during the past few years.” Id. 
 24. See 1 MODERN TORT LAW:  LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 2:1 (J.D. Lee & Barry A. 
Lindahl eds., 2d rev. ed. 2002) [hereinafter 1 MODERN TORT LAW]. 
 25. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 2 
(5th ed. 1984).  Although damages are the usual remedy in tort law, other remedies may also 
be available, such as an injunction or specific restitution. Id. § 1, at 2 n.6. 
 26. Id. § 1, at 3; see, e.g., Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174, 177 (7th Cir. 1945) (holding 
that a child has a cause of action against one for interfering with the support and 
maintenance of its father); Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 142 (D.D.C. 1946) (holding 
that an unborn child, viable and capable of existing independently of the mother at the time 
injuries are wrongfully inflicted, may, after birth, maintain an action for such injuries); Cole 
v. Atlanta & W.P.R. Co., 31 S.E. 107, 107 (Ga. 1897) (holding a common carrier liable for 
insulting a passenger). 
 27. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 6, at 29. 
 28. See id. 
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limited, resulting in “a highly formal and artificial system of procedure, 
which governed and controlled the law as to the substance of wrongs which 
might be remedied.”29  Only two writs existed for tortious conduct:  (1) the 
action of trespass and (2) the action of trespass on the case.30  An action of 
trespass was an action “for all forcible, direct and immediate injuries, 
whether to person or to property.”31  Trespass on the case,32 on the other 
hand, was developed as a complement to the action of trespass “to afford a 
remedy for obviously wrongful conduct resulting in injuries which were not 
forcible or not direct.”33  Today, tort law does not classify injuries as direct 
or indirect, instead the law looks to remedy the intentional harms of the 
tortfeasor or injuries resulting from his negligence.34 
A.   Negligence Generally 
Negligence35 is the primary standard for liability in the modern tort law 
system.36  The transition from the antiquated writs of trespass and action on 
the case was accompanied by a growing recognition that, regardless of the 
form of the action, there should be no liability for pure accident, and that 
the defendant must be found to be at fault—possessing either a wrongful 
intent or negligence.37  Negligence diverged from intentional injuries 
 
 29. See id. 
 30. See id. 
 31. See id. 
 32. Trespass on the case is also known as action on the case. See id. 
 33. See id.   
The classic illustration of the difference between trespass and case is that of a log 
thrown into the highway.  A person struck by the log as it fell could maintain 
trespass against the thrower, since the injury was direct; but one who was hurt by 
stumbling over it as it lay in the road could maintain, not trespass, but an action on 
the case. 
Id.  The emphasis is on whether the injury was direct (trespass) or indirect (trespass on 
the case). Id. § 6, at 29. 
 34. See id. § 8, at 34. 
 35. This Note explores the doctrine of negligence and does not explore intentional torts.  
Intentional torts are separate from torts derived from negligence.  An intentional tort “is one 
in which the actor has the specific intent to inflict injury or engages in conduct that is 
substantially certain to result in injury.” 74 AM. JUR. 2D Torts § 17 (2013).  Hurricane-related 
torts are generally not intentional, and therefore this Note does not explore intentional torts. 
 36. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern 
American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 607 (1992).  Negligence, however, is a relatively 
new concept in tort law. See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 149 (7th 
ed. 2007).  It was not until the nineteenth century, in response to a changing social and 
political environment caused by the Industrial Revolution, that the negligence cause of 
action was first recognized. Id. at 149, 153 (citing Cornelius J. Peck, Negligence and 
Liability Without Fault in Tort Law, 46 WASH. L. REV. 225, 229–30 (1971)).  In contrast, 
under early Anglo-Saxon and medieval common law, individuals were strictly liable for 
causing injury to another individual. Id. at 149–50 (citing Peck, supra, at 225–26).  For 
example, “[t]he doer of a deed was responsible whether he acted innocently or inadvertently, 
because he was the doer.” John H. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts:  Its History, 7 
HARV. L. REV. 315, 317 (1894). 
 37. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 28, at 160–61. 
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(which became a distinct field of liability) and became the “dominant cause 
of action for accidental injury.”38 
Legal historians generally cite Brown v. Kendall39 as the case which 
introduced a fault-based, negligence paradigm to American tort law.40  In 
Brown, two dogs “were fighting in the presence of their masters.”41  In an 
effort to separate the two dogs, the defendant began beating the dogs with a 
stick.42  At one point, the defendant raised his stick, hitting the plaintiff in 
the eye and causing serious injury.43  The plaintiff sought to recover on the 
writ of trespass,44 whereby a plaintiff traditionally could establish a prima 
facie case simply by proving that his injuries were the direct result of the 
defendant’s act—a relationship45 that clearly existed in this case.  The 
court, however, abolished the rule that a direct physical injury entailed strict 
liability.46  The court held that the defendant should only be liable if he was 
at fault.47  A defendant who attempted to beat a dog, but unintentionally 
struck the plaintiff instead, would not be liable for battery despite applying 
direct force.48  Instead, the defendant would be liable for battery only if he 
intended to strike the plaintiff or if he was at fault in striking him.49  
According to the court, fault should be determined by whether or not the 
defendant was acting with “ordinary care and prudence.”50 
Negligence, therefore, is the failure to exercise reasonable care under all 
the circumstances.51  In determining whether a person’s conduct falls below 
the standard of reasonable care, courts consider the foreseeable likelihood 
that the person’s conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable severity of any 
harm that may ensue, and the burden of precautions to eliminate or reduce 
the risk of harm.52  Negligence may consist of an act or omission or failure 
to act.53  Frequently, negligence involves the failure to take reasonable 
precaution.54 
In the United States, each state develops its own tort law, “which 
includes common law, settled disputes that have written judgments, and 
 
 38. See id. § 28, at 161. 
 39. 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850). 
 40. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 28, at 163. 
 41. Brown, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) at 292. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 292–93. 
 44. Id. at 292. 
 45. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 6, at 29. 
 46. Brown, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) at 296. 
 47. Id. at 295. 
 48. Id. at 297. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 298. 
 51. See ELLEN M. BUBLICK, A CONCISE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 59 (3d ed. 2013). 
 52. See id. at 62. 
 53. See 1 MODERN TORT LAW, supra note 24, § 3:1. 
 54. See BUBLICK, supra note 51, at 63. 
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legislation.”55  All state negligence law requires four elements to establish 
liability:  (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) causation, and (4) damages.56 
1.   Duty and Breach 
There must be a legal duty “requiring a person to conform to a certain 
standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable 
risks.”57  If there is no legal duty, the defendant cannot be held liable for the 
injuries he causes.58  Generally, every person “must conform to the legal 
standard of reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent risk.”59  A risk is 
unreasonable if a reasonable person would have foreseen it.60 
Duty is concerned with the relationship between individuals—“it 
imposes a legal obligation on one party for the benefit of the other party.”61  
Thus, courts look to whether a relationship exists between the parties to 
determine whether a legal duty exists.62  Furthermore, the existence of a 
duty is decided based on public policy considerations.63  Whether public 
policy precludes liability is a matter of law decided by the court.64 
Breach is the failure to conform to the required standard of conduct or 
legal duty.65  Although the term negligence is frequently used to mean a 
breach of duty alone, courts use the term to mean the elements of duty and 
breach together.66 
2.   Damage and Causation 
The cause of action also requires loss or damage suffered by the 
plaintiff.67  Thus, doing something that causes no harm does not constitute 
an actionable tort.68  In the past, the types of harm for which compensation 
were allowed were rather restricted.69  However, courts have steadily 
expanded the categories of compensable harm.70  For example, some 
modern courts compensate for intangible injuries, such as emotional harm 
and loss of companionship.71 
 
 55. TERENCE J. CENTNER, AMERICA’S BLAME CULTURE:  POINTING FINGERS AND 
SHUNNING RESTITUTION 23 (2008). 
 56. See id. 
 57. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 30, at 164. 
 58. See 1 MODERN TORT LAW, supra note 24, § 3:3. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See id. § 3:4. 
 61. Id. § 3:3. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 30, at 164. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See id. § 30, at 165. 
 68. See 74 AM. JUR 2D, supra note 35, § 9. 
 69. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 6, at 29. 
 70. See id. § 127, at 951–52. 
 71. See id.; see also Bradley v. Sebelius, 621 F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th Cir. 2010) (stating 
that “under Florida law, in a recovery for wrongful death action, children of the decedent 
may recover for lost parental companionship”); Christensen v. County of Boone, 483 F.3d 
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Finally, the breach of duty must be the cause of the resulting injury.72  
The plaintiff must show that the defendant’s tortious action is both the 
actual cause, or “cause-in-fact,” and the proximate cause of his injuries.73  
The defendant’s action is established as an actual cause by showing that the 
harm would not have occurred but for the defendant’s conduct.74 
The second causal requirement for recovering damages is the 
requirement that the defendant’s conduct be the proximate cause of the 
plaintiff’s injuries.75  Proximate cause is a legal construct that serves to 
establish to what extent a tortfeasor will be held liable for his conduct.76  A 
plaintiff must fulfill three basic requirements in establishing proximate 
cause:  “(1) that without the misconduct, the injury would not have 
occurred, commonly known as the ‘but for’ rule; (2) that the injury was a 
natural and probable result of the misconduct; and (3) that there was no 
efficient intervening cause.”77  Even if a defendant is the “but for” cause of 
a plaintiff’s injuries, a court, through the proximate cause analysis, may 
determine that other considerations outweigh holding a defendant liable, 
such as policy reasons.78 
3.   Foreseeability 
Foreseeability of injury is generally recognized as an element of the duty 
analysis.79  To establish an actor’s negligence, the risk of harm to others 
“must be foreseeable to the actor at the time of his conduct.”80  A plaintiff 
can show negligence by proving that the defendant failed to take a 
precaution that would have reduced the likelihood of harm.81  Usually, this 
precaution “will consist of some way in which the actor could have 
modified the activity engaged in.”82 
B.   The Balancing Approach to Negligence 
A finding of negligence may depend on a court’s cost-benefit analysis.83  
Following Brown, courts became more willing to balance the social benefit 
of an activity with the risk of harm to the public in determining whether the 
defendant presented an unreasonable risk of harm to another.84 
 
454, 465 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating that Illinois law “recognizes the tort of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress”). 
 72. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 30, at 165. 
 73. See 74 AM. JUR 2D, supra note 35, § 27. 
 74. Id. § 26. 
 75. Id. § 27. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See 1 MODERN TORT LAW, supra note 24, § 3:4. 
 80. See BUBLICK, supra note 51, at 62. 
 81. See id. at 63. 
 82. Id. at 64. 
 83. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 34 (1972). 
 84. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster:  The 
American Civil Justice System As a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 26 
(2002). 
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In United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,85 Judge Learned Hand articulated 
a balancing test as the standard for determining questions of liability.86  
Carroll Towing was an admiralty case in which a barge in a busy harbor 
broke loose of its moorings, collided with a tanker, and sank.87  The harm 
could have been avoided if a caretaker or bargee had been on board at all 
times, but the bargee had left the barge the night before.88  The question 
was whether the absence of a bargee makes the owner of a barge liable for 
damages to other vessels when the barge breaks from its moorings.89 
While discussing the barge owner’s negligence, Judge Hand held that 
“the owner’s duty . . . is a function of three variables:  (1) The probability 
that [the barge] will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if 
she does; [and] (3) the burden of adequate precautions.”90  Specifically, the 
probability is the “overall level of the foreseeable risk created by the actor’s 
conduct and the ‘benefit’ is the advantages that the actor or others gain if 
the actor refrains from taking precautions.”91 
Judge Hand further held that the variables could be stated in algebraic 
terms:  “if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; 
liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P:  i.e., 
whether B < PL.”92  The burden can take many forms, but is usually a 
financial burden borne by the actor.93  Thus, the Hand formula is 
susceptible to economic reasoning.94  Under the Hand balancing test, a 
court should hold a defendant liable when he failed to exercise care in a 
setting in which the cost of additional care “is less than the expected injury 
costs that be avoided” (B < PL).95 
C.   Tort Law in the Natural Disaster Context: 
Hurricanes, Negligence, and Acts of God 
Historically, mankind attributed changes in the weather to divine 
forces.96  The concept that weather and its consequences are caused by 
divine forces has slowly penetrated the law.97  Large-scale natural disasters 
have become “viewed as and often called ‘Acts of God’ . . . ‘vis major’, or 
‘force of nature.’”98  In tort law, defendants have often asserted an act of 
 
 85. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
 86. Id. at 173; see also Keith N. Hylton, Duty in Tort Law:  An Economic Approach, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1501, 1502 n.7 (2006). 
 87. See Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 171. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 172. 
 90. Id. at 173. 
 91. See BUBLICK, supra note 51, at 60. 
 92. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173. 
 93. See id. 
 94. See Hylton, supra note 86, at 1503. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See Kenneth T. Kristl, Diminishing the Divine:  Climate Change and the Act of God 
Defense, 15 WIDENER L. REV. 325, 325 (2010). 
 97. See id. 
 98. Id.; see, e.g., Woodbine Auto, Inc. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 8 F. Supp. 2d 475, 481 
(E.D. Pa. 1998) (citations omitted) (“It is well-established that the affirmative defense of vis 
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God defense to avoid liability.99  What constitutes an act of God varies in 
different jurisdictions.100  But many courts define acts of God as natural 
forces, which “must be something more” than ordinary natural events.101  
Courts describe acts of God as natural forces that are “extraordinary,” 
“unexpected,” “sudden,” “unusual,” and “unprecedented.”102  Furthermore, 
courts consider the intensity of the event, characteristics of the area, and 
climatic history in order to determine whether a particular event should be 
classified as an act of God.103 
1.   Foreseeability of Acts of God 
Foreseeability plays a role in courts’ determination of whether a natural 
event should be defined as an act of God.104  Courts require that the event 
“be one that no amount of reasonable foresight . . . or care could have 
prevented.”105  In a negligence action, acts of God relate to the issue of 
 
major or force of nature (formerly ‘Act of God’) is the concept of a natural force of such 
inevitability and irresistibleness that man cannot cope with it, either to predict, forestall it or 
control it when it arrives.”). 
 99. See Kristl, supra note 96, at 328. 
 100. See id. at 329. 
 101. Id. at 329–30. 
 102. See, e.g., Barnard-Curtiss Co. v. United States, 257 F.2d 565, 568 (10th Cir. 1958) 
(holding that a flood could only be an act of God if the rains were “an unprecedented and 
extraordinary occurrence of unusual proportions”); Dollar Thrifty Auto Grp., Inc. v. Bohn-
DC, LLC, 23 So. 3d 301, 304 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that “[a] hurricane that causes 
unexpected and unforeseeable devastation with unprecedented wind velocity, tidal rise, and 
upriver tidal surge is a classic case of an ‘Act of God’ or force majeure”); Brown v. 
Williams, 850 So. 2d 1116, 1123 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (defining act of God as “an unusual, 
sudden and unexpected manifestation of the forces of nature which man cannot resist”). 
 103. See, e.g., Keystone Electric Mfg., Co. v. City of Des Moines, 586 N.W.2d 340, 351 
(Iowa 1998) (holding that to determine whether a flood should be characterized as an act of 
God, “courts consider whether the flood’s ‘occurrence and magnitude should or might have 
been anticipated, in view of the flood history of the locality and the existing conditions 
affecting the likelihood of floods, by a person of reasonable prudence’” (quoting 72 AM. JUR. 
2D Waters § 224, at 669 (1975))); McCutcheon v. Tri-County Grp. XV, Inc., 920 S.W.2d 
627, 632 n.2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that the act of God defense is only available 
“where it is ‘an event in nature so extraordinary that the history of climatic variations in the 
locality affords no reasonable warning of their coming’ and is not humanized through the 
participation of man” (quoting Corrington v. Kalicak, 319 S.W.2d 888, 892 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1959)); Sky Aviation Corp. v. Colt, 475 P.2d 301, 304 (Wyo. 1970) (holding that ordinary 
acts of nature “which are usual at the time and place” which reasonably could not have been 
anticipated will not relieve a negligent person of liability). 
 104. See Kristl, supra note 96, at 331. 
 105. See id.; see also Brown v. Sandals Resorts Int’l, 284 F.3d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that under South Dakota law, “an act of God is defined as ‘any accident, due 
directly and exclusively to natural causes without human intervention, which by no amount 
of foresight, pains, or care, reasonably to have been expected, could have been prevented’” 
(quoting Nw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Henry Carlson Co., 165 N.W.2d 346, 349 (S.D. 1969))); 
Rector v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 120 So. 2d 511, 514–15 (La. Ct. App. 1960) 
(stating that an act of God is an “extraordinary manifestation of the forces of nature which 
could not have been foreseen and the effect thereof avoided by the exercise of reasonable 
prudence, diligence and care” (quoting S. Air Transp. v. Gulf Airways, 40 So. 2d 786, 791 
(La. 1949)); L.G. Balfour Co. v. Ablondi & Boynton Corp., 338 N.E.2d 841, 844 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1975) (defining act of God as a force not attributable to the conduct of man and not 
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negligence in terms of the foreseeability of the natural event and the 
foreseeability of harm occasioned by the actor’s conduct.106  Relevant to 
foreseeability is preventative or precautionary measures available to an 
actor.107 
Several forms of precautions can be relevant in protecting against 
extraordinary natural events or acts of God.108  For example, an “actor can 
be negligent in building facilities that are unreasonably inadequate in 
protecting against foreseeable natural events.”109  Thus, an actor may be 
negligent in designing or constructing a building that collapses during a 
hurricane.110  In such a case, the foreseeable likelihood of harm relates to 
which serious natural events can be contemplated during the expected life 
of the building.111  An actor can also be negligent for failing to adopt 
appropriate precautions when a serious adverse natural event is 
imminent.112  In conducting a negligence analysis in such a case, however, 
the immediacy of the natural event reduces the significance of foreseeability 
as a negligence factor, although foreseeability is still a concern in terms of 
the severity of the storm.113 
2.   Sole Proximate Cause 
An act of God defense may or may not relieve an actor of liability.  A 
determination of liability usually depends on whether or not the act of God 
is the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damage.114  If the act of God is the 
sole or exclusive cause, then an actor will avoid liability.115  However, “in 
cases of joint causation, when two causes, one of human origin and the 
other of natural origin, combine to cause [an] injury,” it is difficult to 
allocate liability between the negligent act of the defendant and the natural 
cause.116  Some courts will not allow the defendant to escape liability if 
there is some element of human activity or intervention that contributes in 
some way to the injury.117  However, other courts may allow a defendant to 
limit his liability to that portion of the injury his own conduct caused.118 
 
reasonably “preventable by human foresight, strength or care” (quoting Hecht v. Bos. Wharf 
Co., 107 N.E. 990, 991 (Mass. 1915)). 
 106. See BUBLICK, supra note 51, at 65–66. 
 107. See id. 
 108. See id. 
 109. Id. at 65. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See id. 
 112. See id. 
 113. Id. at 65–66. 
 114. See Denis Binder, Act of God?  Or Act of Man?:  A Reappraisal of the Act of God 
Defense in Tort Law, 15 REV. LITIG. 1, 24–28 (1996); Kristl, supra note 96, at 332–33. 
 115. Kristl, supra note 96, at 333. 
 116. See Binder, supra note 114, at 24. 
 117. See, e.g., Inland Power & Light Co. v. Grieger, 91 F.2d 811, 816–17 (9th Cir. 1937) 
(stating that when an act of God is concurrent with defendant’s negligence, defendant is 
liable as if he had caused the harm); Fairbrother v. Wiley’s Inc., 331 P.2d 330, 336–37 (Kan. 
1958) (declaring that defendant is not excused from liability when the “‘act of God’ would 
not have wrought the injury but for the human negligence which contributed thereto”); 
Supervisor & Comm’rs v. Jennings, 107 S.E. 312, 315 (N.C. 1921) (describing the well-
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The causation analysis primarily focuses on the reasonableness of the 
defendant’s conduct in light of the foreseeable risks.119  If the defendant 
could have reasonably expected that the resulting injuries might have been 
avoided or prevented by reasonable care or foresight, liability may ensue.120  
Thus, an act of God defense will fail if “one builds in geologically fragile 
areas, or with improper building methods, or follows up with inadequate 
inspection and maintenance.”121 
3.   Negligence and Invoking the Act of God Defense 
To successfully invoke the act of God defense, the party asserting the 
defense must prove not only the occurrence of the act of God but must also 
establish lack of fault in order to avoid liability.122  For example, in Skandia 
Insurance Co. v. Star Shipping,123 plaintiffs sought recovery for damage to 
their cargo sustained due to flooding associated with Hurricane Georges 
while sitting in a container yard in Alabama.124  The parties did not dispute 
that the hurricane was an act of God.125  The plaintiffs, however, argued 
that, even though the hurricane was an act of God, the defendants were 
liable because they failed to take reasonable precautions in securing the 
containers or moving them out of harm’s way.126  In response, the 
defendants invoked the act of God defense, arguing that the damage “could 
not have been prevented by reasonable care and foresight.”127  Specifically, 
they argued it was impossible to move the containers in time to avoid the 
damage.128 
First, the court accepted that an act of God defense was applicable to the 
case, noting that the law considers hurricanes to be acts of God.129  Next, 
the court also accepted that the defense could be asserted in the present 
circumstances because statutes traditionally exempt the responsibilities of 
 
settled rule that the defendant is responsible even though his negligence is concurrent with 
an act of God). 
 118. See, e.g., McAdams v. Chi., R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 205 N.W. 310, 311 (Iowa 1925) 
(holding that a negligent defendant should not be liable for damages that would have resulted 
from a flood regardless of the defendant’s actions); Rix v. Town of Alamogordo, 77 P.2d 
765, 770 (N.M. 1938) (supporting the trial court’s attempt to apportion damages between 
those injuries resulting from unusual rainfall and those resulting from a combination of 
extraordinary rainfall and defendant’s negligent acts); Radburn v. Fir Tree Lumber Co., 145 
P. 632, 633 (Wash. 1915) (holding that the defendant should be liable only for damages to 
crops resulting from the defendant’s negligent act but should not be liable for damages 
resulting from rainfall). 
 119. See Binder, supra note 114, at 29. 
 120. Id. at 25. 
 121. Id. at 25–26. 
 122. See Skandia Ins. Co. v. Star Shipping AS, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1241–42 (S.D. Ala. 
2001). 
 123. 173 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (S.D. Ala. 2001). 
 124. Id. at 1233. 
 125. Id. at 1233 n.2. 
 126. See id. at 1233. 
 127. Id. at 1238. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 1239–40. 
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shippers and carriers, like the defendants, from liability for losses caused by 
an act of God.130  Yet, the court concluded that the defense would apply 
only in the absence of contributing human negligence.131  Thus, the 
defendant not only had to prove that the natural event constituted an act of 
God but also had to show that “damage from the natural event could not 
have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care.”132 
If a defendant had adequate warning and the means to take proper 
precautions but failed to do so, then the defendant cannot invoke the act of 
God defense and thus is responsible for any loss.133  However, if there were 
insufficient warnings or insufficient means to prevent the damage, then the 
defendant is not liable for the loss.134  In other words, the accident or 
damage must be unforeseeable and unavoidable to support the defense.135 
The Skandia Insurance court found that Hurricane Georges, although an 
act of God, was not of such catastrophic proportions as to totally absolve 
the defendants of the responsibility to take reasonable precautions and to 
preclude any negligence assessment.136  Thus, the court looked to whether 
the defendant had established its lack of fault.137  Given that weather 
reports leading up to the storm were inconsistent and constantly changing, 
the court held that the defendants lacked adequate notice of the approaching 
storm and therefore could not have prevented the loss caused by the 
hurricane.138  The court also determined that none of the defendants were 
aware that the container yards where the containers were stored had been 
flooded in previous storms.139  The defendants successfully established that 
reasonable care would not have prevented the water damage to the cargo.140  
Therefore, the plaintiffs were not entitled to recovery because the cargo 
damage was caused by an act of God and not due to any negligence on the 
part of the defendants.141 
D.   What Remains for Tort?  Further Limitations to Tort Recovery 
in a Natural Disaster Context 
All levels of government play a role in providing assistance during and 
after natural disasters.142  The federal government exercises its role through 
 
 130. Id. at 1240. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 1241 (quoting Mamiye Bros. v. Barber S.S. Lines, Inc., 241 F. Supp. 99, 107 
(S.D.N.Y. 1965)). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 1243. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 1243–53. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 1253. 
 141. Id. at 1252. 
 142. David G. Tucker & Alfred O. Bragg III, Florida’s Law of Storms:  Emergency 
Management, Local Government, and the Police Power, 30 STETSON L. REV. 837, 838 
(2001). 
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the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).143  At the state and 
local levels, governments mobilize resources and coordinate response 
efforts.144 
Tort law, however, is private law.145  Typically, “[t]he parties are not the 
public, nor strangers to the controversy, but rather are the actors and victims 
themselves.”146  Thus, natural disasters and large-scale emergencies limit 
the role of tort law because the primary actors are usually public entities or 
government employees who enjoy some degree of immunity.147 
1.   Sovereign Immunity Generally 
The concept of sovereign immunity is rooted in the medieval English 
idea that kings could not be sued because they were governed by divine 
right and could do no wrong.148  As the state replaced the monarch, it also 
took on the sovereign’s immunity.149  The doctrine of sovereign immunity 
was also adopted in the United States and, for a significant period of time, 
courts held that governmental entities were immune from tort liability.150  
However, as recently as the middle of the twentieth century, the federal and 
state governments surrendered their absolute immunity from suit.151  
Nevertheless, some kind of immunity for government entities still 
remains.152 
2.   Federal and State Immunity 
In 1946, the federal government waived its immunity to tort actions 
under certain circumstances by enacting the Federal Tort Claims Act153 
(FTCA).  Under the FTCA, the government is liable for torts in much the 
same way a private actor would be liable.154  The FTCA, however, carves 
out an exception for claims based upon the performance or failure to 
perform a “discretionary function or duty.”155 
 
 143. Id. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See George W. Conk, Will the Post 9/11 World Be a Post-Tort World?, 112 PENN 
ST. L. REV. 175, 177 (2007). 
 146. See id. 
 147. See id. 
 148. See 2 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 334 (2d ed. 2011). 
 149. Id. 
 150. See, e.g., Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 386, 389 (1850) (stating that the 
doctrine is “universally assented to” and “no maxim is thought to be better established”); 
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); Briggs v. Light-Boat Upper Cedar Point, 
93 Mass. (11 Allen) 157, 162 (1865) (recognizing that “[i]t is an elementary and familiar 
principle of English and American constitutional law, that no direct suit can be brought 
against the sovereign in his own courts without his consent”). 
 151. See 2 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 148, § 334. 
 152. Id. 
 153. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012); see also 2 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 148, § 335. 
 154. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (stating that “[t]he United States shall be liable . . . [in] tort 
claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like 
circumstances”). 
 155. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). 
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To determine whether this exception applies, the U.S. Supreme Court 
articulated a two-prong test in Berkovitz v. United States156 and affirmed the 
test in United States v. Gaubert.157  First, a court must consider if the 
governmental action in question involved an element of judgment or choice 
on the part of a government actor.158  The exception cannot apply if a 
federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically mandates a course of action 
for the actor to follow.159  Thus, if the government fails to act in accordance 
with a specific, mandatory directive, the government is vulnerable to 
suit.160  Second, if the challenged conduct does involve an element of 
judgment, that judgment must be based on policy considerations—the types 
of judgments the discretionary function exception was designed to shield.161  
This second prong is met if the actions were susceptible to policy analysis, 
whether or not the government employee actually made a policy 
determination.162  Furthermore, there is a strong presumption that if the 
regulation affords the employee discretion, the employee’s discretionary 
actions necessarily involve policy considerations.163  In sum, for a tort 
claim against the federal government to be successful a plaintiff must first 
show that the conduct in question does not fall within the discretionary 
function exception.164 
Other statutes, especially where the federal government chooses to 
involve itself in the natural disaster or emergency context, specifically 
recognize an exception to tort liability or retain governmental immunity 
altogether.165  For example, the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Act,166 which constitutes the statutory authority for most federal 
disaster responses (especially as they pertain to the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency), includes a discretionary function or duty exemption 
from liability.167  The Flood Control Act of 1928 (FCA) also contains an 
immunity provision, which states:  “No liability of any kind shall attach to 
or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood 
waters at any place.”168  Enacted in 1928 in response to the devastating 
flood of the Mississippi River Valley in 1927, the Flood Control Act was 
 
 156. 486 U.S. 531 (1988). 
 157. 499 U.S. 315 (1991). 
 158. See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 544. 
 161. Id. at 536.  The Court noted that the discretionary function exception was designed 
to “prevent judicial ‘second-guessing’ of legislative and administrative decisions grounded 
in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort.” Id. at 536–
37 (citations omitted). 
 162. See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325. 
 163. See id. at 324. 
 164. See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 544. 
 165. See 42 U.S.C. § 5148 (2012); 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2012). 
 166. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5207.  The Stafford Act guarantees that disaster victims will 
receive help through FEMA, which may include financial assistance. See id. § 5174. 
 167. See id. § 5148.  This section provides that “[t]he Federal Government shall not be 
liable for any claim based upon the exercise or performance of or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function or duty.” See id. 
 168. See 33 U.S.C. § 702c. 
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the federal government’s first major foray into natural disaster 
management.169  Although enacted before the FTCA, courts interpreted the 
FCA to immunize the federal government from suit for any damages 
resulting from negligence in flood-related activities.170  The Supreme 
Court, however, narrowed the FCA immunity in Central Green Co. v. 
United States.171  The Court articulated a new test requiring consideration 
of the “character of the waters that cause the relevant damage rather than 
the relation between that damage and a flood control project.”172  The Court 
required a more case-by-case inquiry into the “character of the waters,” 
recognizing that some floodwaters are immune and others are not.173  Thus, 
the Court opened the government up to liability for damages caused by 
certain floodwaters.174 
Sovereign immunity exists at the state and local levels as well.  The 
Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution bars actions against a state in 
federal court absent consent, waiver, or abrogation of the state’s sovereign 
immunity.175  The doctrine of sovereign immunity is statutorily based in 
most states,176 and constitutionally based in others.177  Like the federal 
government, state laws relating to disaster management, whether natural or 
manmade, also provide for governmental immunity.178 
3.   In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation: 
Governmental Immunity as a Bar to Recovery 
for Hurricane-Related Damage 
In 1956, Congress authorized construction of the Mississippi River Gulf 
Outlet (MRGO), which was completed in 1968 and created a shorter 
 
 169. See Sarah Juvan, Note, The Federal Flood Control Act:  Congressional 
Development of a Modern-Day Ark, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 303, 306 (1996).  The Act “provided 
for a comprehensive program of flood control projects, including the building of dikes, 
dams, and levees.” Id. 
 170. See United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 608, 612 (1986) (holding that the 
immunity provision provided absolute immunity to the federal government for any damage 
related to flood control activities); Nat’l Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263, 270 (8th 
Cir. 1954) (holding that when Congress enacted the FCA, it “safeguarded the United States 
against liability of any kind for damage from or by floods or flood waters in the broadest and 
most emphatic language”). 
 171. 531 U.S. 425 (2001). 
 172. See Cent. Green Co. v. United States, 531 U.S. at 437. 
 173. See id. at 436, 437. 
 174. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 471 F. Supp. 2d 684, 694 (E.D. La. 
2007). 
 175. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 176. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104 (2005); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8103 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1401 (2006); MO. REV. 
STAT. § 537.600 (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-A:1 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:1-2 
(West 2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4 (West 2006); 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2310 (West 
2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60 (2005); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021 
(West 2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-39-104 (2006). 
 177. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. X, § 13; KY. CONST. § 231; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 18; W. 
VA. CONST. art. VI, § 35. 
 178. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26-314 (2006); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8655 (West 
2006); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7704 (West 2006). 
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shipping route between the Gulf of Mexico and New Orleans.179  At the 
same time, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers also implemented the Lake 
Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Plan to protect areas of 
New Orleans from flooding.180  The channel’s original designers considered 
and rejected a plan to armor its banks with foreshore protection, leaving 
them vulnerable to erosion.181 
The Corps’s delay in armoring the MRGO allowed wave wash from large 
vessels to erode the channel considerably and added more fetch,182 allowing 
for more forceful wave attack on the levees.183  When Hurricane Katrina 
struck New Orleans in August 2005, the MRGO’s expansion allowed 
Hurricane Katrina to generate a peak storm surge that breached the levee 
and flooded the city.184  Many property owners sought recovery for their 
losses by filing lawsuits in federal court, naming the federal government as 
a defendant.185  One group of seven plaintiffs, the Robinson plaintiffs, went 
to trial.186  After nineteen days of trial, the district court found that neither 
the immunity provision of the FCA nor the discretionary-function exception 
to the FTCA protected the government from suit.187  The court found three 
of the seven plaintiffs had successfully proven the government’s liability.188 
The government appealed the district court ruling to the Fifth Circuit.189  
In March 2012, the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling190 because 
the MRGO was not a flood-control project.191  The court noted that had the 
Corps installed foreshore protection on the MRGO, it would have given the 
canal the immune character of a flood-control activity.192  The government 
failed to install flood-control protections, however, and therefore could not 
claim FCA immunity.193  The Fifth Circuit next turned to the FTCA and the 
discretionary function exception, upholding the district court’s ruling that 
the exception did not bar the suit.194  After determining that the decision 
about whether to armor the MRGO’s banks involved an element of 
judgment, thus satisfying the first prong of the Berkovitz test, the court 
considered whether the Corps’s inaction met the second prong by involving 
 
 179. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 696 F.3d 436, 441 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc), 
rev’g 673 F.3d 381. 
 180. Id. at 442. 
 181. Id. 
 182. “Fetch is defined as the width of open water that wind can act upon.  The height of 
waves . . . is a function of the depth of the water as well as the width of the expanse (i.e., the 
fetch) over which wind impacts the water.” Id. at 443 n.2. 
 183. Id. at 443. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See id. 
 190. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 673 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2012), rev’d by 696 
F.3d 436. 
 191. See id. at 389. 
 192. Id. at 390. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 391. 
2014] HURRICANE VICTIM COMPENSATION 1639 
policy considerations.195  The court found that the discretionary function of 
the FTCA was inapplicable because the key judgment made by the Corps 
involved only the use of objective scientific principles and not any public-
policy considerations.196 
Following the adverse ruling, an en banc panel reversed the judgments 
for the plaintiffs and granted judgment for the government.197  The Fifth 
Circuit left the holding on the FCA immunity undisturbed from the initial 
ruling.198  The court, however, reassessed its application of the 
discretionary function exception, finding that there was “ample record 
evidence indicating the public-policy character of the Corps’s various 
decisions.”199  The Fifth Circuit explored the availability of alternatives to 
armoring the banks and found that “[t]he Corps’s actual reasons for the 
delay are varied and sometimes unknown, but there can be little dispute that 
the decisions here were susceptible to policy considerations.”200  Thus, 
finding that the discretionary function exception did in fact apply to the 
Corps’s actions, the court held that the exception “completely insulates the 
government from liability.”201 
II.   AN OVERVIEW OF INSURANCE 
This part first defines insurance and property insurance coverage against 
natural forces.  It next describes the insurance issues raised by Hurricane 
Katrina.  Finally, it details government involvement in natural disaster 
insurance, specifically Florida’s Hurricane Catastrophe Fund and the 
federal government’s National Flood Insurance Program. 
A.   Insurance Basics 
“[I]nsurance is a contract by which one party (the insurer), for a 
consideration that usually is paid in money . . . promises to make a certain 
payment, usually of money, upon the destruction or injury of ‘something’ in 
which the other party (the insured) has an interest.”202  The thing that must 
be destroyed or injured to trigger the insurer’s obligation varies according 
to the nature of the contract.203  For example, in the case of fire insurance or 
windstorm insurance, the thing insured is property.204  Risk is the very 
nature of insurance, and individuals take an intellectual gamble when 
 
 195. Id. at 391–96. 
 196. Id. at 391.  “The Corps misjudged the hydrological risk posed by the erosion of 
MRGO’s banks.” Id. 
 197. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 696 F.3d 436, 441 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc), 
rev’g 673 F.3d 381.  Presented with a petition for rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit treated 
the petition as a petition for rehearing and withdrew its initial March 2012 ruling. See id. 
 198. Id. at 444–48. 
 199. Id. at 451. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 454. 
 202. See 1 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1:6 (Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla eds., 3d rev. 
ed. 2011). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
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purchasing insurance as they weigh the expense of purchasing insurance 
against the amount of coverage they purchase.205 
1.   First-Party Insurance Versus Third-Party Insurance 
Insurance policies can be classified in two ways, focusing on who bears 
the loss:  first-party insurance and third-party insurance.206  First-party 
insurance covers losses suffered by the policyholder herself.207  Under a 
first-party insurance scheme, an insurance company “pays [the insured] as 
soon as the damage occurs, provided that it can be proven that the particular 
damage is an insured risk covered by the insurance policy,” regardless of 
whether there is liability.208  Accordingly, first-party insurance protection is 
removed from tort law and provides an insurance scheme whereby insureds 
ex ante seek coverage.209  First-party insurance can be divided further into 
two groups:  (1) personal injury insurance and (2) property insurance.210 
In contrast, third-party insurance provides coverage for losses caused by 
the policyholder.211  These losses are incurred by someone other than the 
policyholder and expose the policyholder to legal liability for causing the 
loss.212  Thus, third-party insurance “treat[s] the loss being insured against 
as that of the outside party.”213  Malpractice liability insurance is a common 
example of third-party insurance.214 
2.   Property Insurance 
One of the most common forms of insurance is property insurance, which 
“includes a broad spectrum of policies and coverages applicable to just 
about any type of property that exists.”215  For insurance purposes, property 
can generally be divided into many categories, including real property and 
personal property.216  The type of property influences the coverage terms, 
such as specific inclusions and specific exclusions “because [the type] 
influence[s] the degree to which the property tends to be exposed to various 
categories of risk.”217  The major risk categories include:  (1) deliberate 
theft; (2) misplacement, misdelivery, or unexplained loss; 
 
 205. See 43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 2 (2013).  For additional detail about insurance and 
risk, see infra Part III.C–D. 
 206. See Ronen Avraham, The Economics of Insurance Law—A Primer, 19 CONN. INS. 
L.J. 29, 35–36 (2012).  This Note will focus on first-party insurance, and property insurance 
in particular.  In the hurricane-related context, victims will primarily turn to their property 
insurance policy, if available, for compensation. See infra Part II.B. 
 207. See Avraham, supra note 206, at 35. 
 208. See Michael Faure & Véronique Bruggeman, Catastrophic Risks and First-Party 
Insurance, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 11–12 (2008). 
 209. Id. at 12. 
 210. Id. at 13. 
 211. See Avraham, supra note 206, at 35–36. 
 212. See id. 
 213. See id. at 36 n.6. 
 214. See id. at 36. 
 215. See 10A COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 202, § 148:1. 
 216. See id. § 148:3. 
 217. Id. 
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(3) contamination, pollution, and the like; and (4) breakage/physical 
damage/destruction.218  Breakage/physical damage/destruction is a broad 
risk category that includes several subcategories, including water and 
wind.219 
The standard property policy specifies the perils and resulting losses it 
covers.220  Most modern insurance policies, however, cover multiple perils 
or provide blanket coverage for “all perils.”221  Specifically, natural force 
perils may be explicitly included or excluded in a policy.222  Insureds, for 
example, “may purchase insurance to cover loss resulting from violent 
storms or high winds [that] may be given any of several labels, including 
cyclone, hurricane, storm, tornado, and windstorm or weather 
insurance.”223 
In order to recover from the insurer, the windstorm must be the 
proximate cause of the damage the insured sustained.224  Proximate cause in 
insurance law, however, is different from proximate cause in tort cases.225  
Some courts have defined proximate cause as the efficient cause or the 
cause that sets other causes in motion.226  Under this definition, an insurer 
is liable for an insured’s claim when the damages sustained were the result 
of a risk or peril covered in the insurance policy.227  Courts have further 
expanded efficient proximate cause to permit recovery in circumstances in 
which two or more causes, one of which is a covered peril and one of which 
is an excluded peril, act concurrently to cause a single loss and the covered 
peril is determined to be the efficient proximate cause.228  However, 
insurers generally contract out of the efficient proximate cause doctrine.229 
 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id.  The most relevant subcategories for this Note’s consideration are water and 
wind.  Other subcategories include (1) fire, explosion, or both, (2) freezing and overheating, 
(3) collision with other objects, (4) mishandling, (5) vandalism and other deliberate acts, and 
(6) misuse and overuse. Id. 
 220. See id. § 148:48.  In a policy against: 
damage by tornado, hurricane, or windstorm, the words “tornado” and “hurricane” 
are synonymous. . . .  The word “windstorm” partially takes its meaning from 
“tornado” and “hurricane” and indicates wind of unusual violence.  A “windstorm” 
need not have either the cyclonic or the whirling features, which usually 
accompany tornadoes or cyclones, but it must assume the aspect of a storm—that 
is, an outburst of tumultuous force. 
See 43 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 205, § 472. 
 221. See 10A COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 202, § 148:50; 11 COUCH ON INSURANCE, 
supra note 202, § 153:2. 
 222. See 11 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 202, § 153:2. 
 223. Id. § 153:4. 
 224. Id. § 153:12. 
 225. See 43 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 205, § 470. 
 226. See 7 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 202, § 101:45; see, e.g., Kish v. Ins. Co. of 
N. Am., 883 P.2d 308, 311 (Wash. 1994) (holding that the efficient proximate cause rule 
operates to permit coverage when an insured peril sets other excluded perils in motion). 
 227. See 7 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 202, § 101:45. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id.; see also TNT Speed & Sport Ctr., Inc. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 114 F.3d 731, 733 
(8th Cir. 1997) (holding that language in an insurance policy reflects the insurer’s intent to 
contract out of application of the efficient proximate cause doctrine). 
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Thus, issues of recovery may arise when there is a question of whether 
the windstorm was in fact the proximate cause of the damage.230  
Specifically, issues of recovery arise when the property damage could have 
been caused by either windstorm or improper construction of the 
property.231  Recovery is only possible “if the windstorm was the cause of 
the damage, and not the improper construction.”232 
Additionally, even if water is a contributing cause to property damage, an 
insured may only recover under a policy insuring against a windstorm if the 
wind is found to be the proximate cause of the damage.233  Furthermore, 
recovery is only possible “if the policy does not contain an exclusion for 
water-related perils.”234  Typically, water is an excluded peril, preventing 
recovery, unless wind first damages the property, and water enters the 
property through openings made by the wind.235 
To recover under a windstorm policy, the insured must show that the 
property damage falls within specified perils of the policy.236  If the insured 
can show that damage is covered, then the burden shifts to the insurer to 
establish that the damage falls within a specified exclusion.237 
B.   Insurance Issues Raised by Hurricane Katrina 
On August 31, 2005, two days after Hurricane Katrina made landfall in 
the Gulf States, at least 80 percent of New Orleans was under floodwater, 
largely as a result of levee failures.238  The hurricane’s strong forces led to 
breaks in the levee, flooding New Orleans with twenty feet of water.239  In 
Mississippi, parts of Biloxi and Gulfport were also flooded as a result of the 
hurricane’s storm surge.240  Despite nearly half of the property damage 
being caused by waters rather than wind, only a few property owners had 
flood insurance coverage under the National Flood Insurance Program.241  
Instead, affected property owners had to turn to their private insurance for 
compensation.242  It became clear, however, that many of the property 
losses resulting from Hurricane Katrina were not covered by insurance.243  
 
 230. See 11 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 202, §§ 153:17, :23. 
 231. Id. § 153:23. 
 232. Id. 
 233. See id. § 153:16. 
 234. Id.; see also infra Part II.B. 
 235. See 11 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 202, § 153:17. 
 236. Id. § 153:25. 
 237. Id. 
 238. See NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NAT’L CLIMATIC DATA CTR., 
HURRICANE KATRINA 5 (2005), available at http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/extremeevents 
/specialreports/Hurricane-Katrina.pdf. 
 239. See id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. See Howard A. VanDine III & Erik T. Norton, Anti-Concurrent Causation Clauses 
and Hurricane Relief:  Was It Wind or Water?, S.C. LAW., Jan. 2008, at 19. See infra Part 
II.C.2.a for a description of the National Flood Insurance Program. 
 242. VanDine III & Norton, supra note 242. 
 243. See Craig A. Cohen & Mark H. Rosenberg, After the Storm:  Courts Grapple with 
the Insurance Coverage Issues Resulting from Hurricane Katrina, 43 TORT TRIAL & INS. 
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Consequently, many policyholders sued their insurance companies, 
“challeng[ing] insurer decisions limiting or denying coverage for hurricane-
related claims.”244 
In Leonard v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,245 plaintiffs sought 
coverage from their insurance company for damage caused by Hurricane 
Katrina.246  The Leonards’ home was twelve feet above sea level on the 
southernmost edge of Pascagoula, Mississippi, less than two hundred yards 
from the Mississippi Sound.247  During Hurricane Katrina, a storm surge 
flooded the first level of the Leonards’ two-story home.248  The Leonards’ 
homeowner’s policy from Nationwide was an “all-risk” policy, which 
covered “all damage to dwellings and personal property not otherwise 
excluded.”249  Nationwide’s policy, however, only covered damage caused 
by certain “perils” and excluded damages caused by others.250  For 
example, the Leonards’ policy insured against wind damage to a dwelling 
and to personal property but excluded damage caused by water.251  The 
water-damages exclusion language of the Leonards’ policy also addressed 
situations in which an excluded peril and a covered peril combine to 
damage a dwelling or personal property.252  This language denied coverage 
whenever an excluded peril and a covered peril acted concurrently to 
combine damage.253 
Following the storm, inspection of the Leonards’ home revealed modest 
wind damage:  the roof suffered broken shingles and loss of ceramic 
granules, doors in the house and garage had been blown open, and a “golf-
ball sized” hole was found in a ground-floor window.254  The water 
damage, however, was extensive.255  While the second floor of the house 
remained untouched, a seventeen-foot storm surge flooded the first floor 
with five feet of water.256  The waters severely damaged the walls, floors, 
fixtures, and personal property.257  After the insurance adjuster evaluated 
the damage, the Leonards received a check for $1661.17—“the amount 
determined attributable solely to wind.”258  Nationwide denied coverage for 
 
PRAC. L.J. 139, 140 (2008) (providing a summary of hurricane-related insurance litigation); 
see also supra notes 232–34 and accompanying text. 
 244. See Cohen, supra note 243, at 140. 
 245. 499 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 246. See Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419, 423 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 424. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. at 425. 
 253. Id.  This language is “commonly referred to as an ‘anticoncurrent-causation clause,’ 
or ‘ACC clause.’” Id. 
 254. Id. at 426. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id.  “At trial, the Leonards offered expert testimony that the total damages actually 
exceeded $130,000, but this figure did not apportion damages caused by different perils.  
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most of the Leonards’ claim because the damages caused by water and the 
storm surge’s concurrent wind-water action were barred by the water 
damages exclusion and the anticoncurrent-causation clause (ACC) of the 
Leonards’ policy, respectively.259 
Following a bench trial, the Southern District of Mississippi held that the 
ACC clause was ambiguous, concluding:  “Thus, [the ACC] language does 
not exclude coverage for different damage, the damage caused by wind, a 
covered peril, even if the wind damage occurred concurrently or in 
sequence with the excluded water damage.  The wind damage is covered; 
the water damage is not.”260  The court applied Mississippi law and held 
that a Mississippi policyholder could recover for loss that is caused by 
wind, even if the damage was also caused concurrently by an excluded 
peril.261  According to the district court, under Mississippi law, the ACC 
clause was invalid.262  Despite invalidating the ACC clause, the district 
court ultimately concluded that only $1,228.16 in damages was caused by 
wind rather than storm surge, and therefore limited the Leonards’ recovery 
to this amount.263 
Nationwide appealed, however, because it was litigating the ACC clause 
issue in other cases in the trial courts, and this ruling could potentially lead 
to enormous liability to other policyholders.264  On appeal, the Fifth Circuit 
analyzed the ACC clause and held that “[c]ontrary to the district court’s 
ruling, Nationwide’s ACC clause is not ambiguous, nor does Mississippi 
law preempt the causation regime the clause applies to hurricane claims.”265  
The Fifth Circuit determined that insurance policies at issue in the 
Mississippi case law, on which the district court based its decision, did not 
contain ACC clauses similar to the one at issue; rather, the doctrine of 
efficient proximate cause controlled in those older cases.266  Furthermore, 
since the Mississippi Supreme Court had not ruled on a claim involving an 
ACC clause, the Fifth Circuit made an “Erie guess”267 on the issue and held 
that the “use of an ACC clause to supplant the default [efficient proximate 
cause] regime is not forbidden by Mississippi case law . . . [and] the ACC 
clause . . . must stand.”268 
 
The Leonards’ wind-specific assessment claimed $47,365.41, including costs for roof 
replacement and structural repairs to the garage.” Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at 428 (quoting Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 684, 693 
(S.D. Miss. 2006)). 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 426. 
 264. Id. at 428. 
 265. Id. at 430. 
 266. Id. at 433–34. 
 267. Id. at 431. 
 268. Id. at 436. 
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C.   Government Involvement in Natural Disaster Insurance 
Although private insurers are generally the insurers of property from 
natural forces, the federal and state governments have shown some interest 
in entering the field of weather-related insurance.269  This section examines 
government involvement in the insurance industry, including the Florida 
Hurricane Catastrophe Fund and Florida’s Citizens Property Insurance 
Corporation, as well as the federal government’s National Flood Insurance 
Program. 
1.   Florida’s Response to Its Insurance Crisis 
Florida is a uniquely risky insurance market because of its size and 
geographical position, with 1200 miles of coastline and most of its insured 
residential and commercial property lying in coastal areas vulnerable to 
both wind and flooding damage.270  On August 24, 1992, Hurricane 
Andrew struck South Florida and ravaged Florida’s private insurance 
industry.271  When the Category 4 hurricane made landfall, the storm had 
sustained wind speeds of approximately 145 miles per hour, with gusts of at 
least 175 miles per hour and storm surges up to 16.9 feet.272  The storm 
destroyed 28,066 homes and damaged another 107,380 homes, leaving 
180,000 people homeless.273  Andrew caused more than $15 billion274 in 
insured damage.275  The scope of Hurricane Andrew’s destruction caught 
many insurance companies unprepared, affecting the efficiency of claims 
processing.276  In 1992, property insurers in Florida collected only $1.5 
billion in premiums and paid out about ten times that amount to victims of 
Hurricane Andrew.277  As a result of the losses caused by Andrew, several 
insurance companies became insolvent and most others believed they were 
overexposed in Florida.278 
In response to the state’s insurance crisis, the Florida legislature created 
the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund.279  The creation of the fund was 
necessary because “insurers were unable or unwilling to maintain 
 
 269. See 11 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 202, § 153:2. 
 270. See David Adams, Analysis:  As Hurricanes Loom, Florida Insurance Lives on 
Borrowed Time, REUTERS (June 1, 2013, 8:10 AM), http://www.reuters.com 
/article/2013/06/01/us-usa-weather-insurance-analysis-idUSBRE95007520130601.  “Only 
New York has as much exposure.” Id. 
 271. See Robert L. Rabin & Suzanne A. Bratis, Financial Compensation for Catastrophic 
Loss in the United States, in DISASTER LAW AND POLICY 292, 296 (Daniel A. Farber et al. 
eds., 2d ed. 2010). 
 272. See id. 
 273. See id. 
 274. Adjusted for inflation, the insured loss is more than $25 billion. See supra note 20 
and accompanying text. 
 275. See 31 FLA. JUR. 2D Insurance § 2542 (2013). 
 276. See Rabin, supra note 271, at 296. 
 277. See id. at 297. 
 278. See id. 
 279. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 215.555(1)(a)–(f) (West 2006). 
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reserves,280 surplus, and reinsurance281 sufficient to enable [them] to pay all 
claims in full in the event” of catastrophic hurricanes.282  Therefore, as a 
condition of doing business in the state, each insurer is required to enter 
into a reimbursement contract with the state, and in return, the contract 
contains a promise “to reimburse the insurer for 45 percent, 75 percent, or 
90 percent of its losses from each covered event in excess of the insurer’s 
retention, plus 5 percent of the reimbursed losses to cover loss adjustment 
expenses.”283 
The legislature also created the Florida Commission on Hurricane Loss 
Projection Methodology within the State Board of Administration.284  The 
Commission consists of “a panel of experts to provide the most actuarially 
sophisticated guidelines and standards for projection of hurricane losses 
possible” to develop reimbursement premium rates for the Florida 
Hurricane Catastrophe Fund.285 
a.  Florida’s Insurer of Last Resort: 
Citizens Property Insurance Corporation 
Property insurance typically does not cover hurricane-related flood 
damage, which has to be insured separately.286  Additionally, most homes 
in Florida are not covered by private insurance but by the federal insurance 
program.287  In 2002, the Florida legislature created Citizens Property 
Insurance Corporation (“Citizens”), a not-for-profit government 
corporation, which sought to more efficiently and effectively provide 
insurance to homeowners in high-risk areas and others who could not find 
coverage in the open, private insurance market.288  Citizens is currently 
Florida’s largest property insurer with 21 percent of the entire residential 
market.289 
Approximately 18 percent of every premium Citizens collected from 
policyholders is allocated to pay hurricane and other catastrophe claims.290  
However, if Citizens has to borrow money to pay its claims after a storm, 
Florida law requires Citizens to place an assessment on both Citizens 
 
 280. Reserves are estimates of amounts insurers will have to pay for losses that have been 
reported but not yet paid, for losses that have been incurred but not yet reported, and for 
administrative costs of resolving claims. See 17A COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 202, 
§ 251:29. 
 281. Reinsurance is when an insurance company transfers its risk under a policy to 
another insurance company. See 1A COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 202, § 9:1.  
Essentially, “reinsurance is insurance for insurance companies.” Id. 
 282. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 215.555(1)(d). 
 283. Id. § 215.555(4)(a)–(b). 
 284. See id.  § 627.0628. 
 285. Id. § 627.0628(1)(c). 
 286. See 11 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 202, § 153.16–.17. 
 287. See Adams, supra note 270. 
 288. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.351(6). 
 289. See Adams, supra note 270. 
 290. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-179, HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE:  
MULTIPLE CHALLENGES MAKE EXPANDING PRIVATE COVERAGE DIFFICULT 35 (2014). 
2014] HURRICANE VICTIM COMPENSATION 1647 
policyholders and private insurance policyholders.291  Citizens charges 
assessments in three tiers, beginning with the Citizens Policyholder 
Surcharge and each additional tier is charged only if the level before it is 
insufficient to eliminate Citizens’ deficit.292  Policyholders are still paying 
off an assessment from Florida’s last storm, Hurricane Wilma in 2005.293 
Citizens has tried to manage its exposure and reduce the potential for 
assessments by issuing catastrophe bonds, which allow the insurer to 
transfer risk to private investors.294  After a successful purchase of $575 
million in private reinsurance and $900 million in pre-event catastrophic 
bonds in 2011, Citizens set a goal of transferring at least $1 billion in 
exposure to private markets by the end of 2012.295  In 2012, Citizens 
reduced its risk by 42 percent by issuing $750 million in catastrophe bonds, 
returning 277,000 policies to the private market, and reducing the property 
value covered in its coastal policies to less than $1 million.296 
b.   Returning Citizens to Its Original Goal 
On May 29, 2013, Florida Governor Rick Scott signed into law a new 
property insurance law designed to further reduce the state’s exposure to 
hurricane losses by reforming the state’s largest insurance company, 
Citizens Property Insurance Corporation.297  Significantly, the bill steers 
some of Citizens’ current insurance policyholders to private insurance 
companies.298  The law establishes a clearinghouse program to match 
Citizens policyholders and applicants with private insurers willing to offer 
coverage at comparable rates.299  The new law also prevents “Citizens from 
insuring homes valued at more than $1 million—a cap that gets lowered 
gradually until it reache[s] $700,000 in 2017.”300  Additionally, any new 
homes built in Florida’s high-risk coastal areas are no longer insured as of 
July 1, 2014.301  The hope is that these changes will return Citizens to its 
original purpose as the insurer of last resort.302 
 
 291. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.351(6)(b)(3)(a)–(j). 
 292. See CITIZENS PROP. INS. CORP., supra note 290. 
 293. See Adams, supra note 270. 
 294. See Michael Adams, Florida’s Citizens Issues Largest Catastrophe Reinsurance 
Bond on Record, INS. J. (May 3, 2012), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/ 
southeast/2012/05/03/246145.htm. 
 295. See Michael Adams, Florida’s Citizens Eyes Risk Transfer While Lawmakers Plot 
Changes, INS. J. (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.insurancejournal.com/ 
news/southeast/2012/01/18/231560.htm. 
 296. See id. 
 297. See Press Release, Fla. Governor Rick Scott, Governor Scott Signs Bill to Reform 
Citizens (May 29, 2013), available at http://www.flgov.com/2013/05/29/governor-scott-
signs-bill-to-reform-citizens/. 
 298. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.3518 (2013). 
 299. Id. § 627.3518(5). 
 300. Chad Hemenway, Florida Gov. Scott Signs Bill to Reform Last-Resort Insurer, 
PROPERTY CASUALTY 360° (May 30, 2013), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/ 
2013/05/30/florida-gov-scott-signs-bill-to-reform-last-resort. 
 301. Id. 
 302. See Hemenway, supra note 300. 
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2.   The Federal Response:  National Flood Insurance 
The federal government has often provided disaster relief after large-
scale storms.303  After Hurricane Betsy struck the Gulf Coast in 1965, 
private insurers began charging excessively high premiums for flood 
insurance, driving many flood victims to depend on “federal taxpayer-
financed, ad hoc disaster programs.”304  The federal flood program was 
created to regularize this practice of providing disaster relief and “to 
provide incentives to municipalities and individuals to limit their risk 
exposure.”305 
a.   The National Flood Insurance Program 
In 1968, upon finding that many factors had made it uneconomical “for 
the private insurance industry alone to make flood insurance available to 
those in need of such protection on reasonable terms and conditions,”306 
Congress created the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) to provide 
flood insurance coverage.307  The NFIP provides  nationwide flood 
insurance through cooperative efforts of the federal government and the 
private insurance industry.308  Additionally, Congress found that a federal 
program would create a uniform standard to regulate development inside 
flood plains and, ultimately, minimize the risk of loss by discouraging 
property development in flood prone areas.309 
FEMA administers the NFIP, and participation in the program depends 
on an agreement between local communities310 and the federal 
government.311  Generally, the agreement states that if a community adopts 
and enforces a floodplain management ordinance to reduce future flood 
risks, the federal government will make flood insurance available within the 
community.312 
Implementation of the NFIP occurs in three stages.313  First, the 
community applies, identifies the flood prone area, prepares preliminary 
 
 303. See Daniel A. Farber, Tort Law in the Era of Climate Change, Katrina, and 9/11:  
Exploring Liability for Extraordinary Risks, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1075, 1119 (2009). 
 304. See Dominic Spinelli, Note, Reform of the National Flood Insurance Program:  
Congress Must Act Before the Next Natural Disaster, 39 REAL EST. L.J. 430, 435 (2011). 
 305. See Farber, supra note 303, at 1119. 
 306. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(b) (2012). 
 307. See Rachel Lisotta, Note, In Over Our Heads:  The Inefficiencies of the National 
Flood Insurance Program and the Institution of Federal Tax Incentives, 10 LOY. MAR. L.J. 
511, 514 (2012). 
 308. See 42 U.S.C. § 4001–4129. 
 309. See id. § 4001(c)(1)–(2). 
 310. Community is defined for NFIP purposes as state, area, or political subdivision. See 
FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE NFIP 3 (2011), 
available at http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1438-20490-1905/f084_atq 
_11aug11.pdf. 
 311. Id. at 1. 
 312. See id. 
 313. See Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water:  The National Flood Insurance Program, 60 
TUL. L. REV. 61, 73 (1985). 
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Flood Insurance Rate Maps,314 and enacts a basic ordinance.315  Second, the 
community enters the Emergency Program through which residents may 
obtain subsidized insurance.316  Third, the community must adopt stricter 
ordinances to enter the Regular Program.317 
Any owner of insurable property may purchase flood insurance coverage, 
provided that the community in which the property is located is a 
participant in the NFIP.318  Although participation in the NFIP is voluntary, 
most mortgage lenders mandate flood insurance for property located in a 
participating community and in an area of high risk.319  Property owners 
may purchase NFIP coverage through any licensed property insurance 
provider.320  All flood coverage through the NFIP is identical from 
company to company and the rates are regulated by the NFIP.321  The rates 
depend on many factors, which include the age, location, and design of the 
building, along with the flood zone.322 
Areas that are at high risk for floods are called Special Flood Hazard 
Areas (SFHA).323  High-risk areas have at least a 1 percent annual chance 
of flooding, or a one-in-four chance of flooding over the life of a thirty-year 
mortgage.324  All homeowners in these areas with mortgages from federally 
regulated or insured lenders are required to purchase flood insurance.325  
Areas that are at low-to-moderate risk for flooding are called Non-Special 
Flood Hazard Areas (NSFHA).326  In moderate-to-low risk areas, the risk of 
flooding is not immediate.327  Flood insurance is not required, although it is 
recommended for all property owners and renters because historically one-
in-four claims come from these moderate-to-low risk areas.328 
 
 314. Flood Insurance Rate Map is the official map of a community “on which FEMA has 
delineated both the special hazard areas and the risk premium zones applicable to 
community.” See Flood Insurance Rate Map, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, 
http://www.fema.gov/floodplain-management/flood-insurance-rate-map-firm (last visited 
Nov. 26, 2014). 
 315. See Houck, supra note 313, at 73. 
 316. See id. 
 317. See id. at 73–74. 
 318. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 310, at 9. 
 319. See id. at 11. 
 320. See id. at 10. 
 321. Id. at 3. 
 322. Id. at 11.  Each flood zone describes the area’s risk of flooding:  low, moderate, or 
high. See What Are Flood Zones?, NAT’L FLOOD INS. PROGRAM, http://www.floodsmart.gov/ 
floodsmart/pages/faqs/what-are-flood-zones.jsp (last visited Nov. 26, 2014). 
 323. See What is a Special Hazard Flood Area (SHFA)?, NAT’L FLOOD INS. PROGRAM, 
http://www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/faqs/what-is-a-special-flood-hazard-area.jsp 
(last visited Nov. 26, 2014). 
 324. See id. 
 325. See supra note 319 and accompanying text. 
 326. See What is a Non-Special Flood Hazard Area (NSFHA)?, NAT’L FLOOD INS. 
PROGRAM, http://www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/faqs/what-is-a-non-special-flood-
hazard-area.jsp (last visited Nov. 26, 2014). 
 327. See id. 
 328. Id. 
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The federal legislation establishing the NFIP also provides the types of 
flood insurance.329  The federal flood insurance covers direct physical loss 
caused by “flood” and categorizes covered losses primarily by the source of 
the damaging water:  “an overflow of inland or tidal waters; unusual and 
rapid accumulation or runoff of surface waters from any source; mudflow; 
or collapse or subsidence of land . . . as a result of erosion or 
undermining . . . that result in a flood.”330  Other limitations on covered 
losses include a requirement that the floodwater affect two or more 
properties, or more than two acres of property for the damage to be eligible 
under the NFIP.331  Furthermore, the NFIP limits specific coverage to 
$250,000 in damages for residential buildings and to $100,000 in damages 
for personal property .332  Currently, more than 5.5 million people hold 
flood insurance policies in communities throughout the United States with 
an insured value of $1.3 trillion.333 
b.   Problems Faced by the National Flood Insurance Program 
The NFIP was intended to reduce the government’s escalating costs for 
repairing flood damage.334  Until 2004, the NFIP was able to pay most of its 
claims with premiums or occasional loans from the Department of the 
Treasury.335  However, after the 2005 hurricane season, the program faced 
an unprecedented amount of claims and had to borrow $16.8 billion from 
the Treasury.336  In 2006, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
added the NFIP to its High-Risk List “due to losses from the 2005 
hurricanes and the financial exposure the program created for the federal 
government.”337 
GAO reported that the NFIP’s financial condition revealed the program 
funding’s structural weaknesses.338  The NFIP is a not-for-profit 
institution.339  The program fulfills a public policy goal:  “provide flood 
insurance in flood-prone areas to property owners who otherwise would not 
be able to obtain it.”340  Congress expected the NFIP to use the premiums it 
collects from insureds to cover claims and its operating expenses.341  
However, the program has been left financially vulnerable because of 
 
 329. See Lisotta, supra note 307, at 514; see also FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, 
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 330. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 329, at 1. 
 331. See id. 
 332. See id. 
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subsidized policies.342  The NFIP sustains losses from these policies 
because it is unable to collect sufficient premiums to cover losses, operating 
costs, and loan payments to the Treasury.  Additionally, most policies “are 
associated with structures more prone to flood damage . . . because of the 
way they were built or their location.”343  Losses to the NFIP are especially 
great in years of catastrophic flooding.344  Furthermore, this “results in 
much of the financial risk of flooding being transferred to the federal 
government and ultimately the taxpayer.”345  As of July 31, 2013, the NFIP 
owed approximately $24 billion to the Treasury.346 
c.   Insurance Reform:  The Biggert-Waters Act 
Recently, Congress passed the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform 
Act of 2012, extending the National Flood Insurance Program until 
September 30, 2017.347  Not only does the law extend the NFIP, but it also 
requires significant reform of the insurance program.  The law requires the 
NFIP to raise rates to reflect true flood risk, make the program more 
financially stable, and change how Flood Insurance Rate Map updates 
impact policyholders.348  There are four major changes:  First, the law 
removes subsidized rate premiums for properties that have been provided 
flood insurance at below-market rates since their communities first joined 
the program, generally in the 1970s.349  Second, it establishes a Technical 
Mapping Advisory Council intended to advise FEMA on improving the 
accuracy of flood maps and on standards that should be adopted for flood 
maps.350  Third, it allows premiums to rise at a significant rate on the basis 
of the new maps.351  Finally, it clarifies FEMA’s authority to transfer a 
portion of the nation’s flood risk to the private sector through the purchase 
of reinsurance.352  Together, these efforts help increase the NFIP’s long-
term financial stability.353 
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The changes were phased in starting in 2012.354  However, on October 
28, 2013, the Senate reached a deal delaying the changes to the federal 
flood insurance program that raise premiums for many homeowners, 
requiring FEMA to address the affordability of coverage before 
implementing the rate increases.355 
III.   TORT OR INSURANCE:  WHICH SYSTEM IS BEST? 
Courts are presented with two alternatives for compensating hurricane 
victims.  Courts may allow victims to litigate their losses through the tort 
system, recognizing new causes of action, where none had been recognized 
before.356  Alternatively, courts can leave compensation to the insurance 
industry.  This part examines the goals and criticisms of tort and insurance.  
The discussion begins by examining the justifications advanced in support 
of the tort system, and then proceeds to discuss the criticisms of these goals.  
Next, this part turns to the goals and criticisms of insurance.  With these 
goals and criticisms in mind, Part IV then examines which system is best 
for compensating victims of hurricanes. 
A.   Justifications in Support of the Tort System 
In the case of hurricanes, questions may arise as to whether tort law even 
applies, and if it does, whether the plaintiff can prove the tortfeasor’s 
negligence.357  Because courts often define hurricanes as acts of God, the 
only viable theory for recovery is usually the failure to take adequate 
preventive measures.358  Thus, the scope of liability is very limited. 
However, a number of different justifications have been advanced in 
support of the tort system.359  As tort law has developed, two leading 
justifications have emerged:  tort law as a means of providing compensation 
to the injured and tort law as a means of deterring future accidents.360 
1.   Making Victims Whole:  Tort’s Goal of Compensation 
The “cardinal principle” of damages in tort cases is that of 
compensation.361  Tort liability is predicated on some form of fault on the 
part of the defendant.362  Consequently, the defendant becomes the source 
 
 354. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 349. 
 355. See Bipartisan Deal Reached to Delay Flood Insurance Premium Hikes:  Waters, 
INS. J. (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/ 
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 356. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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and Economics Perspective, 29 L. & POL’Y 339, 342 (2007). 
 358. See supra Part I.C; supra notes 3–13 and accompanying text. 
 359. See Beltran, supra note 18, at 154. 
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 361. See Fleming James, Jr., Damages in Accident Cases, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 582, 583 
(1956). 
 362. See supra note 37–50 and accompanying text. 
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of compensation.363  Furthermore, compensation is seen as “repairing 
plaintiff’s injury or of making him whole as nearly [as possible] by an 
award of money.”364 
As early as the mid-nineteenth century, “scholars and courts began to 
focus on more general principles for awarding damages,” looking to the 
purpose of damages as compensation.365  Courts also started referring to the 
idea of “mak[ing] the plaintiff whole” no matter what the cause of action.366  
Some courts simply refer to making the victim whole,367 “while others 
write in terms of returning the victim to the position she was in prior to the 
accident368 . . . or putting the victim in the position she would have been in 
‘had there been no injury.’”369  Even jury instructions follow this theory of 
compensation, “directing the jury to award damages that will make the 
victim whole or return her to the position in which she would have been had 
the accident not occurred.”370 
Over the past few decades, modern courts have embraced the principle of 
compensation as the primary goal of tort law.371  This idea has led courts to 
expand liability in certain areas, such as landowner liability.372  For 
example, in Sprecher v. Adamson Co.,373 the court held that a possessor of 
land is no longer immunized from liability for harm caused by the natural 
condition of his land to persons outside his premises.374  In rejecting the 
distinction between artificial and natural conditions in favor of ordinary 
principles of negligence to determine exposure to liability, the court held:  
“‘A [person’s] life or limb [or property] does not become less worthy of 
protection by the law nor a loss less worthy of compensation under the law’ 
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 365. See Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money:  Against the Insurance Theory of Tort 
Compensation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1567, 1578 (1997); see also McInroy v. Dyer, 47 Pa. 118, 
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because that person has been injured by a natural, as opposed to an 
artificial, condition.”375 
Compensation or “making a victim whole” receives judicial expression 
as a normative ideal in that courts see compensation as “a means of 
achieving fairness.”376  This notion of fairness can be seen as an outgrowth 
of the fault principle of tort:  “If the defendant is the wrongdoer . . . it seems 
eminently fair that these damages should (at least) put the plaintiff, as 
nearly as may be, in the same position he would have been if defendant’s 
wrong had not injured him.”377  Although notions of fairness are 
particularly applicable to cases of personal injury, notions of fairness also 
apply to cases of harm to property.378 
In negligence suits, judges and juries are typically faced with choosing 
between “a single plaintiff who may have suffered greatly and a defendant 
who is a giant enterprise or is backed” by third-party liability insurance.379  
On the one hand, judges and juries see defendants that “can readily absorb 
and widely distribute this loss” through the mechanism of the price system 
or through third-party liability insurance.380  On the other hand, an 
individual victim may not be able to bear the financial burden of the loss 
very well.381 
2.  The Deterrence Function of Tort Law: 
Reduction of Accidents and the Optimization of Risk 
Another primary goal of tort law is deterrence or the reduction of 
accidents.382  Simply stated, tort liability deters dangerous conduct.383  
Otherwise, without the threat of liability, people act without regard to the 
safety of others, and “[a]s a result, people (and property) would be 
unreasonably damaged.”384  However, tort law forces people to take the 
interests of others into account by instituting liability for negligent conduct, 
which threatens the possibility of litigation costs and hefty compensatory 
damages.385  Thus, tort law causes people to alter their behavior in a 
“socially desirable, less injury-reducing way,” to avoid liability.386 
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Tort law as a deterrence mechanism can also be examined using an 
economic efficiency analysis.387  Under this analysis, tort law ought to 
encourage people to act efficiently and optimize accident costs.388  
Proponents of this goal, like Judge Richard A. Posner, interpret Judge 
Hand’s famous formula389 as giving an “economic meaning to 
negligence.”390  Consequently, Judge Posner sees the negligence standard 
as a weighing of costs and benefits, “promoting the most efficient allocation 
of resources because its economic calculus encourages only cost-justified 
precautions.”391 
As discussed in Part I.B, under the Hand formula, liability depends on 
whether the burden of taking a precaution is less than the loss or injury 
multiplied by the probability that the loss will occur.392  Judge Posner 
explains that by “the burden of taking precautions against the accident,” 
Hand was referring to the cost of prevention.393  The cost of prevention, he 
further explains, “may be the cost of installing safety equipment or 
otherwise making an activity safer.”394  The cost could also be seen as the 
loss of a benefit caused by curtailing or eliminating an activity.395  Thus, if 
the costs of prevention are less than the potential injury, “society is better 
off if those costs are incurred and the accident averted.”396  Thus, tort 
liability is imposed leading the tortfeasor to adopt “precautions in order to 
avoid a greater cost in tort judgments.”397  If, on the other hand, the cost of 
precautions exceeds the potential loss by injury (B > PL), “society would be 
better off, in economic terms, to forgo accident prevention.”398  Here, the 
threat of liability cannot “induce the [injurer] to increase the safety of [his 
conduct]” because a “rational profit-maximizing [person] will pay tort 
judgments to the accident victims rather than incur the larger cost of 
avoiding liability.”399  Furthermore, Judge Posner explains, in such 
instances it is more efficient for society to allow the defendant to avoid the 
excessive costs of accident prevention.400 
Judge Posner applies the same economic analysis to accident avoidance 
by the victim.401  If the victim could have avoided the accident by taking 
precautions “at lower cost than any measure taken by the injurer would 
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involve, it [is] uneconomical to adopt a rule of liability that placed the 
burden of accident prevention on the injurer.”402 
Thus, according to Judge Posner, the “dominant function” of tort law is 
to encourage people to act efficiently or optimize accident costs.403  Under 
this view, “a judgment of negligence implies that there was a cheaper 
alternative to the accident.”404  Conversely, where the alternatives to the 
accident are burdensome, it is less efficient to attach liability to a 
defendant’s actions.405 
Optimizing accident costs is also the basis for Judge Guido Calabresi’s 
analysis of the tort system.406  Using an economic analysis of tort law, 
Judge Calabresi views the primary goal of tort law as a means to minimize 
the cost of accidents.407  Judge Calabresi further divided this goal down into 
three subgoals:  (1) primary cost avoidance (the reduction in the number 
and severity of accidents resulting in injuries); (2) secondary cost avoidance 
(the reduction of societal costs resulting from accidents); and (3) tertiary 
cost avoidance (the reduction in the costs of administering a regulatory 
system for achieving primary and secondary cost avoidance).408  In order to 
reduce the cost of accidents, Judge Calabresi argues that the tort system 
should focus on primary accident cost avoidance or the deterrence of 
accidents, rather than secondary cost avoidance.409  Additionally, according 
to Judge Calabresi, tort law ought to work by means of general 
deterrence.410 
Judge Calabresi, as an economist, assumes that individuals will respond 
to price changes.411  General deterrence (or market deterrence) encourages 
individuals through pricing to avoid a given course of conduct or to go 
about it in a way that promises to make it less expensive.412  Specifically, 
the general deterrence approach operates in two ways to reduce accident 
costs.413  First, it creates incentives to engage in safer activities—some 
people who would engage in a relatively dangerous activity at prices that 
did not reflect its accident costs will shift to a safer activity if the accident 
costs are reflected in prices.414  Thus, the shift from a dangerous activity to 
 
 402. See id. 
 403. Id. 
 404. Id. 
 405. See id. 
 406. Timothy C. Galligan, Jr., Deterrence:  The Legitimate Function of the Public Tort, 
58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1019, 1032 (2001). 
 407. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS:  A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 26–27 (1970). 
 408. See id. at 26–29. 
 409. See id. at 43–44. 
 410. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Accidents of the Great Society, 64 
MD. L. REV. 364, 375 (2005). 
 411. See CALABRESI, supra note 407, at 70. 
 412. See id. at 103–04. 
 413. See id. at 73. 
 414. See id. 
2014] HURRICANE VICTIM COMPENSATION 1657 
a safer activity will reduce accident costs.415  Second, general deterrence 
reduces accident costs by encouraging persons to make activities safer.416 
A general deterrence approach presents a follow-up question:  Who ought 
the law incentivize to change his conduct to promote primary accident cost 
avoidance most effectively?417  Calabresi’s answer is that the law ought to 
search for the cheapest cost avoider and place the losses associated with 
certain accidents on that actor.418  If the goal of general deterrence is 
primary accident cost avoidance, then the tort system should allocate the 
costs of accidents to those who could avoid the accident costs most 
cheaply.419  Cost avoidance should be the responsibility of the actor who is 
in the best position to make the cost-benefit analysis between accident costs 
and accident avoidance costs and to take preventive measures when they are 
cheaper than the avoided accident costs.420 
B.   Criticisms of the Tort System 
Professor Sugarman argues that there is widespread social consensus in 
favor of deterring socially undesirable behavior and compensating 
victims.421  However, the tort system has many critics.422  These critics 
argue that the justifications advanced in support of the tort system are 
unattainable or inefficiently pursued.423  This part explores these criticisms 
by first examining the criticisms of tort’s goal of compensation and then 
turning to the criticisms of the goal of deterrence. 
1.   Failure to Compensate 
The first serious criticism of tort law is that its goal of compensation 
fails.  The deficiencies of tort as a compensation system can generally be 
seen as undercompensation and overcompensation, arbitrary compensation, 
and high administrative costs that undercut compensation.424 
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“Tort law cannot provide compensation to enormous numbers of accident 
victims.”425  There are many accidents where the plaintiff cannot identify a 
plausible defendant with superior loss-spreading ability.426  Many tort 
defendants are judgment-proof or have no funds to satisfy tort 
judgments.427  Plaintiffs will also “settle cases for less than full loss because 
of delay, lack of proof, urgent financial need, contributory negligence, and 
limited insurance.”428  Furthermore, despite the liberalization of certain tort 
claims, courts have generally narrowed liability.429  Absent fault, there is no 
liability.430 
Thus, “both reality and current doctrine create a substantial liability 
gap.”431  Furthermore, “tort law bars compensation to victims who, from 
the perspective of their need, are as deserving as those who succeed through 
the system.”432  Thus, the tort system leaves a large proportion of seriously 
injured victims uncompensated or substantially undercompensated.433 
However, on the other hand, compared with other systems of 
compensation, tort law may be overcompensating victims.434  Although 
many tort cases result in no claims at all, plaintiffs in other cases may 
receive more compensation than they deserve because defendants find 
buying off claims cheaper than litigation.435  Tort law also refuses to 
consider the victim’s other sources of compensation, like insurance.436   
Compensation through tort can also seem arbitrary.437  “Geographical 
bias also pervades the system.”438  For example, states have adopted 
considerably different positions toward the problem of asbestos injuries, 
even though the problem is national.439 
Finally, the tort system is administratively expensive in comparison to 
other compensation systems.440  First, liability insurance policies lead to 
large insurance commissions and other marketing costs.441  And, the 
“highly individualized and unpredictable rules [of tort law] promote 
exorbitant claims administration, including investigation costs and lawyer 
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fees.”442  As a result, probably only half of any insurance money goes to the 
plaintiff.443 
2.   General Deterrence Fails 
The major criticism of tort as a deterrence mechanism is that this 
function “overemphasizes both the amount of overly dangerous activity that 
would occur without tort liability, and the amount of injury-reduction 
achieved.”444  More specifically, the tort model of general deterrence fails 
for five reasons.445 
First, people are usually ignorant of the law.446  Deterrence requires 
knowledge.447  Yet, Sugarman argues that many people seem to be ignorant 
of the threat of tort liability.448  He attributes this “in part to individual 
inattentiveness and in part to our society’s failure to instruct people 
effectively in their civil obligations.”449  Furthermore, even a sophisticated 
potential tort defendant has many reasons to see the system as highly 
unpredictable.450  “These reasons include doctrinal complexity, rapid legal 
change, state-to-state variance, the perceived lottery-like nature of secret 
jury decision-making, the [inconsistencies] of trials, and [quick settlement] 
practices.”451 
People may also fail to appreciate that they are engaging in injury-
producing conduct.452  This can occur because people are not aware of the 
consequences of their behavior.  On the other hand people might not take 
the time to “analyze all the information necessary to make the ‘right’ 
decision” because such decisions often take “too much time, money, or 
attentiveness.”453  Thus, people may “rely on shortcuts such as rules of 
thumb or advice and customs of others.”454  Unavailability of information 
can also undermine deterrence.455  For example, “people don’t become 
aware that their conduct or product is harmful until long after the harm has 
occurred.”456 
Second, people are generally incompetent.457  The “reasonable person” 
standard is difficult for ordinary people to meet.458  “Ordinary people 
occasionally act clumsily, rashly, or absent-mindedly.”459 
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Third, people generally discount the threat of tort liability.460  Sometimes 
this discounting can be quite rational because some victims with bona fide 
claims will not sue or the judicial system will fail to impose liability.461  
Additionally, a defendant “is aware that many cases can be settled for far 
less than the . . . damages incurred.”462  Or the risk is discounted because it 
is so small.463  Still further, larger risks are ignored because potential 
tortfeasors “hop[e] that miraculously no one will be hurt or that they [will 
not] be caught.”464 
Fourth, people put their personal needs before those of others, even when 
their conduct is dangerous.465  Yet the conduct remains socially 
unacceptable.466  Still, the tort law system, through settlements, leads 
“people to conclude that paying monetary damages is an acceptable tradeoff 
for the ability to engage in objectionable high-stakes conduct.”467 
Fifth, people generally conclude that they face little penalty because the 
tortfeasor can almost always avoid an official slap on the wrist by 
settlement.468  Related to this is the idea, Sugarman argues, that people will 
not change their behavior in response to the threat of having to pay for the 
harm they cause if, in practice, that threat is sharply reduced or 
eliminated.469  The threat to pay damages is reduced or eliminated due to a 
few factors.  For example, many individuals do not have the resources with 
which to pay damages.470  Thus, “the threat of a judgment is not 
meaningful.”471  Additionally, tort damages are inadequate.472  The 
deterrence function of tort law “requires the correct threat in order to 
produce the appropriate safety-minded response.”473  But tort damages are 
meant to compensate those who are injured and not to deter the injurer.474  
Finally, market imperfections also weaken the penalty of tort damages.475  
A defendant can always shift the cost of tort damages to its consumers and 
avoid any meaningful loss.476 
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C.   The Role of First-Party Insurance in the Compensatory System 
Another significant part of the compensatory system for hurricane 
victims is first-party insurance.477  First-party insurance protection trends 
away from tort law as victims seek protection before the loss occurs.478  
Under such a scheme, in the event of significant loss the burden of 
compensating the victim falls on the victim’s own insurer, rather than a 
third-party tortfeasor.479  The role of first-party insurance is “to protect 
communal welfare by protecting against catastrophic losses” such that first-
party insurance “can fill in where the tort system cannot provide 
remedies.”480  For example, first-party insurance may protect against events 
that are arguably not caused through the fault of any actor, such as fire or 
flood damage.481  Insurance protects the communal welfare by performing 
three related but distinct functions in the compensatory system:  risk-
bearing, risk-distribution, and loss prevention. 
1.   A Risk-Bearing Role 
First, insurance transfers risk from the insured to the insurer.482  This 
transfer of risk “enhances economic stability and personal security by 
making the future more predictable.”483  It is assumed that a vast majority 
of individuals are risk averse when faced with the possibility of large future 
losses.484  Risk aversion is the preference for certainty over uncertainty with 
regard to future losses.485  Thus, “a risk averse individual will pay a small 
premium now to protect against potentially large, but uncertain losses in the 
future . . . .”486  Furthermore, risk aversion also affects what type of 
insurance and how much coverage an individual purchases.487 
2.   A Risk-Spreading Role 
Next, insurance is a mechanism by which risk is spread among many 
individuals.488  Insurance spreads the risk of loss among all participants by 
pooling insureds.489  Pooling insureds is a successful method of spreading 
risk because not all insureds will suffer losses at the same time and the pool 
is large enough to sustain some loss.490  Thus, “insurance is a risk-sharing 
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arrangement.”491  It spreads the loss among a larger group of people.492  
The risk-sharing function of insurance largely erodes the “individualistic 
rationale of traditional tort law.”493 
3.   Loss Prevention 
Finally, insurance may also prevent or minimize loss.494  Insurance 
companies have the institutional knowledge and expertise to suggest and 
implement cost-effective preventative measures.495  Through reduced 
premiums insurers may incentivize insureds to prevent or minimize loss.496  
For example, the installation of a sprinkler system may reduce the risk of a 
fire destroying a commercial property by half.497  Not only is the risk of the 
property being destroyed reduced by installing the sprinkler system, the 
insurance “premium to be paid is also likely reduced to [a little more than] 
$5,000.”498  The property owner will have an incentive to upgrade its 
sprinkler system and thus reduce the risk of his future loss “if installing and 
maintaining the sprinkler system will cost less than $5,000 per year, and its 
installation can be easily verified by the insurer.”499 
D.   Problems with First-Party Insurance 
For insurance to effectively perform its three functions, it must overcome 
four problems:  (1) accurate prediction of risk, (2) moral hazard, (3) cross-
subsidization, and (4) adverse selection.  The following four sections 
discuss these problems in detail. 
For the insurance system to be successful, insurance companies must be 
able to accurately predict risk.500  This predictability is fundamental to 
setting a price for coverage and pooling its insureds.501  Without reliable 
information “about the probability and magnitude of losses . . . insurance 
cannot function effectively.”502 
When insurance premiums do not adequately reflect the risk being 
insured against, “insureds will not fully internalize expected accident costs 
and, consequently, will not invest efficiently in prevention.”503  This is 
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called “moral hazard.”504  Despite the risk being reflected in higher 
premiums, the insured only considers her individual cost because the true 
cost of the risk is spread among policyholders.505  Therefore, insurance is 
not effective in preventing accidents because insureds are not “required to 
weigh the full costs to themselves of an accident-prone activity against the 
benefits . . . .”506 
Related to the problem of accurately predicting risk is cross-
subsidization.  Policyholders are not charged premiums based on their 
individual risk.507  For example, policyholders “who present different levels 
of risk . . . are charged the same premium and lumped into the same 
insurance pool [as] low-damage insureds [and end up] cross-subsidiz[ing] 
high-damage insureds.”508  Accordingly, the low-risk policyholders pay 
more than the amount necessary to incentivize them to avoid dangerous 
conduct.509 
Another problem with insurance occurs “when potential insureds who 
know that they pose above average risk ‘self-select’ into insurance 
pools.”510  Known as “adverse selection,” this problem is a caused by 
“(1) the insurer’s inability to classify insureds perfectly according to each 
insured’s [risk], and (2) the insureds knowing how their own [risks] 
compare to the average expected damages of the insurance pool.”511  
Adverse selection poses a problem because it “rais[es] the pool’s average 
risk and thereby forces low-risk individuals to choose between paying 
disproportionately high premiums or foregoing insurance.”512 
IV.  NO CLEAR WINNER:  EXAMINING HURRICANE VICTIM COMPENSATION 
IN LIGHT OF THE GOALS AND CRITICISMS 
OF THE TORT AND INSURANCE SYSTEMS 
The legal system provides a mix of public and private methods for 
compensating victims of natural disasters.513  Part IV attempts to determine 
which system, tort or insurance, is best for compensating hurricane victims 
by examining hurricane compensation in light of the goals and criticisms of 
the two systems.  First, Part IV.A considers hurricane compensation in light 
of the goals and criticisms of the tort system.  Next, Part IV.B considers the 
compensation of hurricane victims in light of the goals and criticisms of the 
insurance system. Finally, this Note concludes that neither system 
adequately compensates all hurricane victims, although tort law may 
achieve its goal of deterrence in a natural disaster context. 
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A.   Examining Tort Law 
First, before the success of tort’s goals can be evaluated, the issue of 
whether there is even a role for tort in a hurricane-related context must be 
addressed.  Specifically, in the context of hurricane-related damage, tort 
litigation against responsible private parties has significant limitations.514  
First, a plaintiff must prove the tortfeasor’s fault to recover.515  Second, 
overcoming certain defenses, such as the act of God defense, is also 
essential to recovery.516  Additionally, responsible governmental actors are 
almost always immune from suit.517  Thus, tort litigation is limited to 
actions against private actors who negligently fail to take reasonable 
measures to prevent hurricane-related damage, such as the 2 Gold 
defendants.518 
The tort law system’s goals of compensating victims for their injuries and 
deterring future accidents are commendable, but, as the discussion above 
has shown, there is great debate regarding whether tort can effectively 
achieve either of these goals.519  First, there has been tremendous 
discussion over whether tort damages actually compensate an injured 
victim.520 
Tort’s goal of making a victim whole simply means placing the victim in 
a position he would have been in had the damage not occurred.521  In the 
circumstances of hurricane victims, such as the residents of 2 Gold, this 
would mean replacing items that were stolen or damaged due to the 
defendants’ negligence.522  In situations involving serious real and personal 
property damage after a hurricane, tort damages can be insufficient.  First, 
there may be no plausible defendant because of certain immunities and 
defenses, so there may be no recovery at all.523  Second, the substantive law 
may bar the suit altogether.524  Thus, although the assertions that tort law 
overcompensates seem unfounded in this context, the argument by tort 
critics that tort undercompensates seems to ring true.525 
Next, if a potential plaintiff is successful in litigating a claim, the tort 
system can take a substantial portion of the damages for administrative 
costs and attorney’s fees, leaving the victim with even less 
compensation.526  Finally, the ability of individuals to purchase insurance 
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that will provide them with protection should hurricane damage occur 
reveals that the law’s compensation function is less essential.527 
Despite these factors, the tort system continues to play a role, though in 
somewhat limited circumstances, as a deterrent.528  In the context of a tort 
action for the negligent failure to take reasonable measures to prevent 
hurricane-related damage, the threat of tort liability may successfully lead 
individuals to take more care.529  Many sophisticated hurricane-related 
defendants, like TF Cornerstone, were in the best position to make the cost-
benefit analysis between accident costs and accident avoidance costs and to 
take the preventative measures, if cheaper than the accident costs.530  A 
judgment of liability implies there was a cheaper alternative to the 
damage.531  Some defendants may shift these costs to consumers, but the 
threat of tort liability will cause other potential tortfeasors to take necessary 
precautions in the future, avoiding serious damage.532  Thus, in the 
hurricane-related context tort law may serve more as a deterrence 
mechanism than as compensation. 
B.   Examining Insurance 
Catastrophic losses are precisely the kinds of risk for which loss-
spreading, through some sort of insurance scheme, seems most 
appropriate.533  The advance purchase of private insurance that covers a 
particular peril in question may ameliorate the financial consequences of 
many of the losses that result from catastrophic events like hurricanes.534 
However, the insurance method of compensation also has limitations 
when it comes to compensating hurricane victims.535  Specifically, 
hurricanes adversely affect and will continue to affect insurers’ ability to 
adequately perform its goals.536  For example, insurers will feel the impact 
of hurricanes on property, where the insurer bears the risk of the loss 
suffered directly by the policyholder.537  Large-scale natural disasters, such 
as hurricanes, are a significant threat to insurer solvency.538 
Additionally, the unavailability of insurance due to the exclusion of 
certain catastrophic risks creates significant hurdles to recovery.539  
Furthermore, potential victims may not purchase insurance even if it is 
available.540  Some people may feel they simply cannot afford to buy the 
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insurance, while others, who could afford to buy private insurance coverage 
do not because they might fail to appreciate their own risk.541  This could 
happen if coverage is sold separately for a specific risk, such as flood 
insurance, because potential victims may discount that particular threat to 
them, thereby concluding that insurance is unnecessary and too 
expensive.542 
The insurance industry seems reluctant to provide coverage for large-
scale natural disasters.543  This reluctance may be in part because of the 
difficulty of assessing risk levels, as well as the costs associated with 
maintaining large levels of reserve or reinsurance.544  Flood damage 
insurance provides a good example.545  The federal flood insurance 
program is based in part on the reluctance of the private market to provide 
such insurance on a broad scale.546  However, the federally subsidized flood 
insurance is not an entirely satisfactory solution.  Private losses from 
catastrophes in the United States have been rising faster than premiums, 
causing the government’s liabilities to exceed its assets, leading to extreme 
debt.547  The government has tried to counteract this problem by raising 
premiums to reflect properties’ true risk, but such changes have been 
halted.548  Both private and public insurance systems leave gaps in 
compensation because they can only compensate those who have insurance.  
Thus, neither private nor public insurance successfully compensates all 
hurricane victims. 
CONCLUSION 
Hurricanes are unpredictable, unavoidable, and most often devastating.  
There is some consensus that hurricanes may increase in the future, and if 
they do, there is no doubt that significant damage will occur.549  When such 
damage occurs, those who have suffered loss will seek compensation either 
from their insurance provider or the tort system.550 
This Note provides a hard look at which system, tort or insurance, would 
best compensate hurricane victims.551  However, when the next large-scale 
natural disaster strikes the United States, it is difficult to imagine which 
mechanism will best compensate victims because each system is plagued 
with limitations and neither system satisfactorily makes victims whole.552  
There is one significant role tort could play in hurricane-related damage—
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the role of deterrence.553  Tort could effectively deter negligent behavior by 
imposing liability on those who negligently fail to prepare and prevent 
hurricane-related damage.554 
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